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PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PROGRAMME IN PRIMARY 
HEALTH CARE: ANALYZING PERFORMANCE  
AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION IN THE  
RIO GRANDE DO NORTE STATE
ABSTRACT
Introduction: Pay-for-performance or performance-based financing systems have been adopted worldwide in 
public health. Following the international trend, Brazil implemented in 2011 the National Program for Improv-
ing Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ). 
Originality/value: This study therefore addresses how the National Program for Improving Primary Care Ac-
cess and Quality contributes to the exercise of social control in Brazilian municipalities as a tool for managing 
public health policy. 
Purpose: In this regard, the objective of this study outline connections between the performance of the health 
teams in the PMAQ and the participatory health councils, based on the experiences of councillors and manag-
ers from the three large municipalities in the state of Rio Grande do Norte. 
Research Design: The research included semi-structured interviews with members of participatory health 
councils and health managers, as well as the systematization of information collected in official documents 
and articles about PMAQ. 
Findings: It was concluded that the data collected on user satisfaction with public health services have a high 
potential to inform Municipal Health Councils in their role of quality control, which occurs in the three large 
municipalities of Rio Grande do Norte. 
Keywords: pay-for-performance (P4P); public policy evaluation; Municipal Health Councils;  social participa-
tion; public health
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PROGRAMA DE PAGAMENTO POR DESEMPENHO 
NA ATENÇÃO BÁSICA À SAÚDE: ANALISANDO 
DESEMPENHO E PARTICIPAÇÃO SOCIAL NO 
ESTADO DO RIO GRANDE DO NORTE
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RESUMO
Introdução: Os sistemas de pagamento por desempenho ou de financiamento com base no desempenho 
foram adotados mundialmente na saúde pública. Seguindo a tendência internacional, o Brasil implantou em 
2011 o Programa Nacional de Melhoria do Acesso e da Qualidade da Atenção Básica (PMAQ). 
Originalidade/relevância: Este estudo, portanto, aborda como o Programa Nacional de Melhoria do Acesso e 
da Qualidade da Atenção Básica contribui para o exercício do controle social nos municípios brasileiros como 
instrumento de gestão das políticas públicas de saúde. 
Objetivo: Nesse sentido, o objetivo deste estudo traçar relações entre a atuação das equipes de saúde do 
PMAQ e dos conselhos participativos de saúde, a partir das experiências de conselheiros e gestores dos três 
grandes municípios do estado do Rio Grande do Norte. 
Métodos: A pesquisa incluiu entrevistas semiestruturadas com membros de conselhos participativos de saúde 
e gestores de saúde, bem como a sistematização de informações coletadas em documentos oficiais e artigos 
sobre o PMAQ. 
Conclusões: Concluiu-se que os dados coletados sobre a satisfação dos usuários com os serviços públicos de 
saúde apresentam alto potencial para informar os Conselhos Municipais de Saúde sobre seu papel no controle 
de qualidade, que ocorre nos três grandes municípios do Rio Grande do Norte.
Palavras-chave: pagamento por desempenho (P4P); avaliação de políticas públicas; análise de políticas públi-
cas; Conselhos Municipais de Saúde; participação social
1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the lack of investments in public health, when compared with other countries, 
Brazil has one of the biggest public health systems in the world known as “Sistema Único de Saúde” 
(SUS). All the Brazilian population and foreigners that are temporarily in Brazil can access this system 
to receive medical assistance. The SUS was created after the Federal Constitution in 1988 as part of 
the legacy of the Sanitary Movement. 
The SUS is also part of the prevention paradigm that is a result of the improvement of the 
living conditions of the population. The prevention paradigm is the opposite of the Flexnerian para-
digm (biomedical) where the most important is to treat the disease. The Primary Health Care (PHC) 
is sustained by the prevention paradigm. 
The World Health Organization (2018, p.5) states in the Astana Declaration that the 
“strengthening primary health care (PHC) is the most inclusive, effective and efficient approach to 
enhance people’s physical and mental health, as well as social well-being and that PHC is a corner-
stone of a sustainable health system”. In Brazil, the PHC is offered through the SUS in almost all the 
municipalities by the Family Health Programme/Strategy since 1994. 
Since its implementation in 1994, there has been a constant expansion of the population 
covered by the Family Health Strategy (FHS), but there are still gaps in the Brazilian National Health 
System. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) regarding the coverage of essential 
health services, Brazil is with approximately 77% of the population covered, while Canada and the 
United States lead the ranking with more than 80% of the population covered (WHO, 2018).
The Family Health Strategy is characterized by the proximity of health teams to the popula-
tion living in each territory. As a result of the SUS territorialisation principle, each team is responsible 
for an average of 3000 people and, at most, 4000 people in a geographical area (Andrade, 2015). 
These teams are composed of a family doctor, nurse, nursing assistant and four or more community 
health assistants, which may also include social workers and dentists and provide the circumscribed 
population in the territory with a series of services related to primary care. 
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Pay-for-performance (P4P) programs are part of the solution found by health system man-
agers around the world to increase population access, quality, and efficiency of health services. Such 
programs have been adopted worldwide to induce the improvement of health systems through fi-
nancial incentives, inputs or improvements in the structure. P4Ps have been implemented since the 
late 1990s in countries such as China (Wagstaff & Yu, 2007); England, Wales and Scotland (Boeckxs-
taens et al., 2011); Australia (Cashin & Chi, 2014) and  Cameroon (De Allegri et al., 2018). Most part 
of these pay-for-performance programs are focused on the Primary Health Care services offered by 
the governments. 
In the context of implementation of pay-for-performance programs in several countries, 
the Brazilian Ministry of Health implemented the National Program for Improving Primary Care Ac-
cess and Quality (PMAQ) in 2011. The PMAQ was inspired by the “Quality and Outcomes Frame-
work”, the British experience of pay for health performance. The PMAQ was implemented with the 
objective of systematically evaluating the teams of professionals in the Family Health Strategy and 
to justify the increase in the investment of financial resources in primary health care (Saddi & Pego, 
2018). The PMAQ is probably the largest pay-for-performance program in the world, considering the 
number of health teams evaluated, the amount of resources invested and the number of users of 
the Unified Health System served by these professionals (Macinko et al. 2017).
In 2014, 4.2 billions reais were invested in the PMAQ (Macinko et al., 2017). Although it 
seems to be a big amount of money invested in public health, the resources invested in Conditional 
Cash Transference Program called Bolsa Familia was around 24.6 billion reais in 2014 (Ministério do 
Planejamento, 2014).
The purpose of this paper is to outline connections between the performance of the health 
teams in the PMAQ and the participatory health councils, based on the experiences of counselors 
and managers from the three large municipalities in the state of Rio Grande do Norte.
It is important to know how participatory health councils use information collected about 
user satisfaction in their role of overseeing public policies (Macinko et al., 2017), including the rela-
tionship they establish with the primary care teams in the evaluation performed in the PMAQ. The 
Brazilian Federal Constitution states that the actions and health services offered to the population 
must be part of an unified system built with the following guidelines: devolution, integral service 
focusing prevention and social participation (Brazil, 2020). And the law creating the Unified Health 
System (SUS) states that in all municipalities must create a Municipal Health Council providing the 
opportunity to the social participation and social control in the health policies (Brazil, 1990). Then, 
it is essential to understand how the community participation supported the PMAQ evaluation pro-
cess and how the information collected during the evaluations can provide inputs to the social con-
trol exercised by the population in these democratic spaces. 
 The maintenance of the centralized character of the decisions, the incipience of the pro-
cesses of democratization and the democratic control over the health system is a political-manageri-
al problem (Teixeira et al., 2014). In this sense, research on social participation and social control has 
the potential to contribute to finding solutions that minimize managerial political problems in the 
management of the Unified Health System (SUS).
Thus, this article contributes to the literature regarding performance payment systems and 
social control based on cases of Brazilian municipalities with satisfactory performance in the PMAQ. 
The exercise, from the theoretical-methodological point of view, is to verify connections between 
PMAQ performance and the functioning of participatory health councils.
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2 PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PROGRAMS IN HEALTH CARE, 
SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL
Pay-for-performance programs (P4P) or performance-based financing (PBF) have been 
adopted worldwide in public health since the late 1990s. Although they vary in invested resources 
and problems they intend to solve, the objective is to improve the quality of services provided to us-
ers. Pay-for-performance programs originated from a project in Cambodia that received support from 
the World Bank during its implementation in Africa (Fritsche et al., 2014 apud Saddi, Peckham and 
Mundim, 2018). The World Bank continued to encourage P4P health programs in different parts of 
the world such as China with the Health VIII in 1998 (Wagstaff, Yu, 2007), and the pay-for-performance 
program implemented in Cameroon in 2011 (De Allegri et al., 2018).
In Brazil, the National Program for Improving Primary Care Access and Quality (PMAQ) was 
implemented by the Ministry of Health’s Basic Attention Department (DAB) in 2011. The PMAQ was 
inspired by the British experience with the QOF and the pay-for-performance program implemented 
in the Autonomous Region of Andalusia, Spain. The participation of the Research Network on Primary 
Health Care, Federal Universities from various regions of the country and internationally recognized re-
search institutions, such as the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ), have taken place since the PMAQ 
formulation process until the current process of evaluation of health teams.
In the external evaluation process carried out under the PMAQ there are four components: 
self-assessment, performance in contracted indicators in the adhesion, performance in quality stand-
ards verified in loco and data collection regarding user satisfaction. The data collected regarding user 
satisfaction are not part of the final score of the teams of health professionals. However, the data 
collected on user satisfaction have the potential to contribute to the strengthening of social control. 
In Brazil, as well as in other countries that have implemented pay-for-performance systems, little is 
known about how such systems contribute to strengthening social control and social participation via, 
for example, public policy boards.
Social participation in public policies should be encouraged, as it favors transparency, stimu-
lating the accountability of managers and contributing to relevant social demands in the governmental 
agenda. Social participation is included in the term “public engagement” and is related to the possibil-
ity of expressing opinions in governmental actions (Nabatchi and Amsler, 2014).
According to Fischer (2003, p. 205), citizens’ participation in a democracy, is both a right and 
an obligation and “can contribute to the legitimacy of the development of public policies and their 
implementation”. Social participation includes direct participation and indirect participation (Nabacthi 
et al, 2015). In indirect participation individuals choose representatives to act on their behalf, while in 
direct participation individuals are directly engaged in decision making and problem solving (Nabacthi 
et al, 2015).
In Brazil, democracy is semi-direct and thus combines political representation, in which citi-
zens participate by electing their representatives by voting (indirect participation), with forms of direct 
participation in plebiscites, referendum and popular initiatives brought to public policy conferences 
and advice. Social participation can contribute to building consensus and increasing coordination in 
public policies. Such consensus-building makes it possible to identify and develop new ideas shared 
through the coordinated action of agents (Fischer, 2003).
There are other benefits of participation, such as diminishing conflicts, increasing confidence 
in government actions, learning about public policy problems, and clarifying possible disagreements in 
controversial points of view (Fischer, 2003). In addition, social participation is a way for the improve-
ment of representative democracy to improve the instruments of control of pay-for-performance pro-
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grams in public health.
The word control came from the French term “contre role” and Latin medieval evolving in 
1611 to a meaning close to that of domain, government, supervision, and verification (Guerra, 2005). 
There are several typologies for defining control in public administration. Regarding the positioning of 
the controlling organ, for example, the control can be defined as internal or external. Thus, internal 
control is that performed by an organ in the same hierarchical structure, which may refer to adminis-
trative controls or hierarchical control (Lima, 2018). External control is characterized by jurisdictional, 
political, or technical control (Lima, 2018). Regarding the controller’s position, the social control, exer-
cised by the participation of the company, can be considered external control.
Social control is a type of control of governmental actions that can be exercised by citizens 
in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation phases of public policies and in the supervision of 
government acts. Participation is one of the constitutional guidelines that guides the Unified Health 
System (SUS) in Brazil. In addition, the 1988 Federal Constitution institutionalizes public policy manage-
ment boards at the federal, state, and municipal levels as areas of social control.
The Participatory Health Councils are spaces for the participation of multiple actors (colle-
giate bodies) in the Unified Health System (Brasil, 1990). The councils are permanent instances of social 
deliberation composed of representatives of government, service providers, health professionals and 
users. As far as the PMAQ is concerned, Participatory Health Councils should be informed about the 
municipality’s health team adhesion to the pay-for-performance program. In addition, in the external 
evaluation phase of the health teams, it is demanded the collection of information to perform the 
evaluation of user satisfaction, which can be used as an instrument for social control carried out by the 
participatory health councils.
Studies on the Brazilian pay-for-performance programme have been published internation-
ally and nationally. In the international literature, experts present an analysis of the PMAQ with rec-
ommendations for the program to achieve its objective of improving the quality and access of primary 
care (Macinko et al., 2017). In the national literature, there are studies that focus on parts of the as-
sessment process such as self-assessment (Cardoso et al., 2015); external evaluation (Matta-Machado 
et al., 2016; Fontana et al., 2016) and user satisfaction (Protasio et al., 2017a; Protasio et al., 2017b). In 
addition, there are authors who deal with the evaluation of the PMAQ adherence process (Chimara et 
al., 2013); evaluation of the PMAQ implementation process (Linhares et al., 2014) and understand the 
PMAQ as an innovation (Uchôa et al., 2018).
In addition, there are studies such as Lemos et al. (2018) that mention the possibility of the 
PMAQ contributing to the strengthening of Social Control by the Participatory Health Councils. In a 
study carried out in the Northeast of the State of Minas Gerais with data from the PMAQ self-assess-
ment part, in about 50% of the municipalities there was a recognition that municipal management did 
not support social participation and social control (Cardoso et al., 2015). In our search of the literature 
we did not find any studies dealing specifically with the social control carried out by the Municipal 
Health Councils and the PMAQ.
3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
It is important to highlight that this study is part of a doctoral thesis. The main author 
remained one year and ten months in the research field collecting data. This includes a period of 
six months abroad in United Kingdom where it was realized an international data collection com-
paring pay-for-performance programmes in UK and Brazil. 
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The first version of this paper was presented during the 4th International Conference on 
Public Policy in 2019, Montreal, Canada. All the comments received during the paper presentation 
were considered by the authors. 
This is a multiple case study (Gustafsson, 2017) on social control in a pay for performance 
program based on the empirical data collection in three municipalities of Rio Grande do Norte 
with a population equal to or greater than 100 thousand inhabitants, as showed in figure 6. These 
three municipalities belong to stratum 5 and 6 in the PMAQ’s evaluation which means they have 
great population and better income. In the field, semi structured interviews were applied with 
councillors from the Municipal Health Councils. 
The PMAQ evaluation has a set of indicators in areas such as Women and Children health. 
However, it is important to highlight that the performance analyzed here is overall performance in 
all the assessment with more than 900 questions. 
The performance results analyzed in this paper were extracted from the first and second 
evaluations of the Primary Health Care teams’ part of the PMAQ in Rio Grande do Norte State. 
The results were accessed through the Law of Access to the Information in a request directly to 
the Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health sent the results to the researchers in Excel spread-
sheets. The data received were organized by health team. Then, the researchers consolidated the 
data for each municipality in this study in order to obtain the average performance.  
In addition, it was conducted interviews with health managers in the city of Mossoró, 
Parnamirim, Natal, and a PMAQ’s manager in the Ministry of Health in Brasilia totaling twelve 
informants. 
Table 1- List of the interviews
At least three health councillors were chosen, respecting the diversity by segment repre-
sented in the Participatory Health Council. This ensured the various stakeholders/interests repre-
sented within each municipal health council were considered. The snowball technique was used to 
choose the members of the three councils (Goodman, 1961).
 The municipalities are Natal (877640 inhabitants), which is the State capital, Mossoró 
(259.815 inhabitants) and Parnamirim (202.456 inhabitants) (Brazilian Institute of Geography and 
Statistics, 2018). Natal is the capital of the State and the most populous municipality. The coastal 
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municipality of Parnamirim is bordered by the municipality of Natal. Mossoró, in turn, is the second 
largest municipality and is located at the western side of the State. The specification of this popu-
lation (three cases) reduces variations and helps to define the limits for the generalization of the 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Figure 1- Rio Grande do Norte State’s map with the municipalities above 100 thousand inhabitants 
Source: Research data
Results from the first (November 2011 to June 2013) and second (June 2013 to September 
2015) PMAQ evaluation cycles were included in the analysis. The analysis was carried out to answer 
this question: can connections be established between the performance of the teams in PMAQ and 
the functioning of municipal health councils in large municipalities from the experiences of counse-
lors and managers?  
The data on the performance of the teams were obtained through a request for access to 
the information directed to the Department of Primary Health Care of the Ministry of Health. Data 
related to the coverage and the amount of financial resources that each municipality received were 
obtained from the website of the Department of Primary Health Care in the Ministry of Health. 
After the data collection, we carried out a data analysis in two categories that merged from 
the literature: performance of teams in PMAQ and Social Participation and Social Control in the 
PMAQ. 
4 PERFORMANCE OF HEALTH TEAMS IN PMAQ
The Ministry of Health conducts evaluation and payment according to the teams’ perfor-
mance. However, resources are not transferred directly to the teams, but to the municipality, man-
aged by the Municipal Health Department which then have local discretion about how to invest 
PMAQ resources to develop actions related to primary care at the local level. Some Brazilian munic-
ipalities provide bonuses according to performance for local health teams, however, Macinko et al. 
(2017) point out that little is known about how municipal managers invest the resources from the 
PMAQ, which teams receive the bonuses and how the distributed bonuses are related to the total 
amount of funds received. 
It is important to note that there is no uniformity in the management of resources received 
through the PMAQ by the municipalities studied in this article. In the municipality of Mossoró, re-
sources are apportioned as follows: 20% in primary health care costs and 80% are allocated to health 
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professionals as performance bonuses (Mossoró, 2015). In this municipality, there is a difference of 
42% (forty-two percent) between the amount of resources destined to the payment of bonuses for 
higher and middle level professionals (Mossoró, 2015). The apportionment carried out in the munic-
ipality of Mossoró privileges professionals with a higher level of education, in addition to distributing 
bonuses to teams with better performances.
In the municipality of Parnamirim, 50% (fifty percent) of the resources are applied to the 
cost and the other 50% (fifty percent) are passed on monthly as a performance bonus to the health 
professionals of the teams evaluated (Parnamirim, 2015). In Natal, 60% (sixty percent) is allocated 
to costing actions and 40% (forty percent) to pay bonuses to health professionals from primary care 
teams (Natal, 2018).
In Natal, bonuses are distributed twice a year, while in Mossoró and Parnamirim, they 
are distributed monthly. The municipal laws that regulate the allocation of PMAQ resources in Par-
namirim and Mossoró were enacted in the last quarter of 2015 and, in Natal, only in early 2018. The 
social control carried out by the Municipal Health Councils of Parnamirim and Mossoró played an 
important role regarding the pressure to Legislative Power create a legislation regulating the use of 
resources. 
In Natal, there was no decisive influence of the council. The promulgation of Law for the 
regulation of the PMAQ and organization of the apportionment of resources in Natal happened 
three years after the promulgation of the other two municipalities, although with transfers from the 
Ministry of Health since 2013. This fact happened because, until 2018, according to the interviews, 
managers from the municipality of Natal chose to invest the resources of PMAQ fully in health costs, 
which did not include payment of bonus.
During the process of evaluating the quality of health services provided by the Family Health 
Strategy teams, municipalities are separated into six strata that vary according to the Gross Domestic 
Product(GDP), demographic density, the percentage of the population with health insurance, the 
percentage of the population receiving conditional cash transferences such as Bolsa Família and the 
percentage of the population in extreme poverty. Thus, the performance of family health teams is 
only compared to the performance of teams from the same stratum. Only Natal belongs to stratum 
6 (municipalities with population above 500 thousand inhabitants). In stratum 5 (municipalities with 
population between 100 and 500 thousand inhabitants) are the municipalities of Parnamirim and 
Mossoró.
 The total received by the municipalities in the PMAQ varies according to performance 
in the external evaluations. In the first cycle, Rio Grande do Norte received around US$612615 
(US$1=R$3,90) from the PMAQ. The municipalities of Parnamirim, Mossoró and Natal received to-
gether US$60923 in the first cycle, which corresponds to approximately 10% of the resources in 
health budget destined to the entire state.
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Figure 2- Amount of resources received by municipalities in the PMAQ Total (US$)
Source: Ministry of Health
The analysis of the municipalities’ performance studied in this article shows that the evalu-
ation process carried under PMAQ is supporting the improvement of the health team’s performance 
in Rio Grande do Norte. In the first cycle, which occurred between 2011 and 2013, approximately 
63% of the teams in the municipality of Mossoró achieved “median or below average” performance 
and 38% of the teams performed “above average” performance, as we can see in Figure 9. In the 
second cycle, approximately 36% of the teams scored “median or below average”, while 47% of the 
teams scored “above average” and 18% of the teams scored “high performance”, as showed in figure 
2. In this sense, it is observed that the performance of the basic health and oral health care teams 
improved after the implementation of the PMAQ.
In the municipality of Parnamirim, approximately 40% of the teams achieved “Median or 
below average” performance in the first PMAQ evaluation, while 60% of the teams scored “above 
average”. In the second cycle, 29% of Parnamirim’s teams scored “average or below average”, 58% of 
the teams had “above average” performance and 13% of the teams scored “high performance”. Like 
the municipality of Mossoró, it was observed that the teams improved the performance between 
one cycle and another in Parnamirim.
In terms of amount of money received by each team in the municipalities, in the munici-
pality of Mossoró each health team received in average US$790 in the first evaluation and US$1661 
in the second evaluation. 
The health teams in Natal received an average US$298 in the first evaluation and an aver-
age of US$330 in the second evaluation. In Parnamirim, each health teams received US$620 in the 
first evaluation and US$712 in the second evaluation.
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Figure 3 - Health teams’ performance in the First PMAQ Evaluation
Source: Ministry of Health
Regarding the performance of the Natal’s health teams, in the first cycle of PMAQ, 84% 
of the teams presented “median or below average” results and 16% presented “above average” 
results. In the second cycle, Natal’s health teams showed improvement, since 78% had a “median 
or below average” result, 21% had an “above average” result and approximately 0.92% had a “high 
performance” result. Despite the improvement, there is still poor performance.
Figure 4 - Health teams’ performance in the Second PMAQ Evaluation
Source: Ministry of Health
As previously mentioned, the actions of the participatory health councils of Parnamirim 
and Mossoró contributed to the regulation of the use of the resources of the PMAQ in these munic-
ipalities. In addition, participatory health councils worked to ensure that most of the resources were 
allocated to health teams. Observing the data in figure 4, we can conclude that the municipalities 
that invested most of the resources in bonuses for the health teams were able to obtain the best 
 results in terms of performance. In the next section we will carry out an analysis about social control 
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in the PMAQ.
5 SOCIAL PARTICIPATION AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE 
PMAQ
Democracy in Brazil is semi-direct, so citizens can participate indirectly or directly in the 
conduct of public policies. Social participation through municipal health councils is a type of direct 
participation (Nabacthi et al., 2015). In the context of the evaluation of the PMAQ, the council is 
primarily responsible for monitoring resources and mediating conflicts. 
Regarding the inspection of PMAQ activities, in the municipality of Parnamirim, for ex-
ample, the Participatory Health Council is part of a commission that supervises the apportionment 
and transfer of resources to health professionals as a bonus for performance. In the municipality of 
Natal, for example, this apportionment began to be realized approximately three years after the be-
ginning of the apportionment of the municipality of Parnamirim. In this sense, participatory health 
councils are important in building consensus and in developing the idea that resources received by 
the municipality should be prorated among health professionals and health managers:
“The PMAQ resources only started to be prorated in the municipality based on the 
demands of the Municipal Health Council. If we had not awakened to this, no one would 
have known what was being done with the PMAQ resources. The PMAQ resource was 
transferred from the federal government to the municipality of Parnamirim, but it did 
not reach the health teams, and nobody knows where this resource was being invested” 
(Councillor 4-Parnamirim city). 
Among the suggestions for improvement, the councilors mentioned the creation of an in-
ternal monitoring and control committee of the PMAQ in the municipality involving the participation 
of community and key stakeholder representatives. This action happens formally only in the munici-
pality of Parnamirim, since Mossoró and Natal do not have specific committees to follow the PMAQ. 
These commissions could assess the situation of the municipality before the Ministry of Health. 
“Another suggestion would be for PMAQ to establish that municipalities create monitoring and 
internal control commissions. (…) If the Ministry’s evaluation is every two years, the evaluation 
of the municipality could be annual or every six months. With that, the commission would 
have a list of the goals that were not achieved and it could point out where the municipality 
could improve” (Councillor 5 -Parnamirim city).
This commission could be useful for clarifying possible disagreements in controversial 
points of view and it could also helps the Primary Health Care teams to improve the quality of the 
servicers offered to population. 
In the legal guidance that regulates the PMAQ in the municipality of Parnamirim, the cre-
ation of a permanent committee composed of four members is planned to follow the scope of the 
contracted indicators in the PMAQ. The Parnamirim’s participatory health council maintains a rep-
resentative in this permanent committee to monitor and supervise the actions of health managers 
and monitor the performance of the Family Health Strategy teams.
 The commission in the municipality of Parnamirim is one of the examples of how social 
control favors the transparency and efficiency of public policies. This commission acts to verify ir-
regularities, such as the payment of bonuses to employees who were not part of the primary care 
teams and the Family Health Strategy.
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In the legislation that established the PMAQ, there is an indication that the teams must 
communicate their adhesion to the program to the participatory health council (Ministry of Health, 
2011). In all the municipalities, this obligation was observed.  In figure 5 is possible to observe the 
participation process of Municipal Health Councils in the PMAQ:
Figure 5 - Participation process of Municipal Health Councils in the PMAQ
Source: Research Data
The PMAQ is evaluated by members of the councils as a positive tool and contributed to 
the advancement of primary care in municipalities. Among the strengths of the PMAQ were men-
tioned in the interviews: I) the creation of a productivity bonus in the municipalities and the possi-
bility of linking this bonus with the performance of health professionals; II) the mobilization of the 
professionals in offering a quality service in the evaluation year.
In all participatory health councils analyzed, there was a greater participation of the groups 
representing the users of public health services and health workers. The health workers with the 
highest participation in the observed municipal councils were the Community Health Agents. Com-
munity Health Agents are part of the Family Health Strategy teams and work in the territory making 
home visits to the families.
In such a context, PMAQ has the potential to strengthen participatory approaches to social 
control in Brazil. The information collected in the external evaluations provide valuable information 
for participatory health councils to exercise their oversight role. Both councillors and health manag-
ers interviewed in this study have a positive idea about PMAQ:
“The PMAQ gave an injection of encouragement to the workers at the top to organize what 
they failed to organize at times like the question of organizing the unit itself” (Councillor 1- 
Mossoró city)
   (…)
“PMAQ is nothing more than what professionals already have to do. The PMAQ is nothing 
more than organizing your work process so that we can assess an improvement in the quality 
and access to primary care. There is nothing more, no more assignments. These are standards 
that a health unit must follow and the PMAQ is an incentive for us to increase that population’s 
access. PMAQ is very good at motivating teams” (Health Manager- Natal city)
PMAQ is not a program that incentivizes a total change in the health care process, it is a 
program designed to give support to the health teams offer services to the population following the 
best practices already known in public health. 
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In particular, the information collected about user satisfaction could be used to inform the 
Municipal Health Councils actions. Protasio et al. (2017a) identified that the main factors influencing 
a positive evaluation of the user regarding health services in all regions of Brazil are the user to solve 
their problems in the Health Unit and feel respected by health professionals. 
 Despite the difficulties and limitations of the Unified Health System, the population per-
ceives in a positive way the attention it receives from the health teams (Abreu et al., 2018). Abreu 
et al. (2018) still show that there is a positive relationship between users’ perception regarding ac-
cessibility, completeness, longitudinally and coordination of care and services provided by health 
professionals.
Although the perception of users regarding the quality of basic care in Brazil is positive, 
there are conflicts and issues within the PMAQ that need to be rethought by health managers so 
that social inequalities are not deepened in Brazil. According to the PMAQ’s manager at Ministry of 
Health:
“There is no action to avoid the side effects as the depth of social inequalities. We are currently 
discussing the redesign of the PMAQ for the next cycle and we are discussing the introduction 
of equity mechanisms. We are very concerned about this in this fourth cycle that will begin 
because we realize that the PMAQ to some extent reproduces inequities. He favors those who 
are already better”.
(PMAQ’s manager- Ministry of Health)
Counsellors interviewed pointed another weaknesses in the PMAQ: (i) discretion in the use 
of resources from the federal government is a source of conflict between municipal managers and 
health professionals;  II) the absence of clear goals, since the Ministry of Health does not divulge 
which of the indicators evaluated contribute more to the performance; III) the calculation of the 
performance of the teams is also conditioned by the infrastructure conditions on which the teams 
cannot act, since it is the responsibility of the health managers. According to the councillor 7 from 
the municipality of Natal:
“PMAQ ends up being a source of resources for management. And workers understand that it 
is more demanding and more responsibility on their backs. It is as if the PMAQ was something 
distant from the work process. Often, the PMAQ does not assess concrete conditions. 
The apportionment is not equated to the work of each one within the team” (Councillor 
7-Municipality of Natal).
Health teams are evaluated for performance, but unlike in the private sector, the bonus 
for performance excellence or the penalty for poor performance does not go directly to the teams. 
Municipal health managers receive the financial resources of the federal government that are des-
ignated for PMAQ. And these managers have the freedom to invest resources as they see fit, such 
as investment in infrastructure or bonuses to employees (Macinko et al., 2017). However, health 
professionals are in conflict with health managers because the professionals would prefer most of 
the resources to be allocated for the payment of bonuses.
In the three municipalities studied in this article, a disparity was observed regarding the 
decision-making about the investment of resources. Macinko et al. (2017) notes that little is known 
about how municipalities invest resources from government. In this study we found that in Mossoró, 
80% of resources were designated for health professionals, while Parnamirim paid 50% of resources 
in bonuses and Natal distributed 40% of the resources to professionals. The municipal councils of 
health have representatives of health professionals as members, so it was observed that in the cases 
analyzed the councils defend the interests of these professionals by a greater percentage in the dis-
tribution of resources – although to varying degrees. In addition to professional/manager conflicts 
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the disparity in the distribution of bonuses among health professionals also gives rise to conflict. 
In Mossoró, where health professionals received the highest percentage of bonuses in this 
study, the teams achieved the best performance among the three municipalities. In turn, in Natal, 
where the lowest bonus was paid, the teams had the lowest performance in the two cycles analyz-
ed. Therefore, there would appear to be a relationship between the payment of bonuses to health 
professionals and performance in the cases in this study. However, to determine whether this is a 
general phenomenon further research is needed, not only with regard to the finding of such a direct 
relationship from a quantitative analysis contemplating a greater number of municipalities, but also 
exploring the explanatory motives of the phenomenon through more in-depth research. 
The conflict over resource allocation reveals the complexity of public health challenges to 
be overcome in Brazil. From the point of view of municipal managers, the resource received through 
PMAQ represents significant resources to alleviate the lack of resources to finance health services in 
Brazilian municipalities. On the other hand, health professionals perceive the PMAQ resource as an 
opportunity to have recognition for the service provided and as a way of increasing their incomes. 
From the point of view of managers of the Ministry of Health, the granting of freedom to managers 
for the use of resources is based on the view that Brazilian municipalities have differences in relation 
to public health problems and that a single solution would not be the best improve the quality of 
public health.
Similar to pay-for-performance programs in other countries, PMAQ may have undesired 
consequences depending on the strategy adopted by municipalities in program management (Mac-
inko et al, 2017). In all municipalities studied, there was a higher bonus for the best performing 
teams in the PMAQ evaluation. In turn, lower performers received fewer resources. This strategy 
may favor the deepening of social inequality in the country (Macinko et al., 2017), since the poor 
performers may be in areas where the social problems are bigger and the working conditions of the 
health teams are more precarious conditions.
6 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
The findings of this study suggest that PMAQ has a high potential for strengthening social 
control in primary health care in Brazil. The data collected about user satisfaction, the structure of 
the Primary Care Health Units and the work process of the Family Health Strategy teams provides 
valuable information to support greater social control of the delivery of public health services. In this 
sense, training actions are necessary to enable the councilors to know about the indicators and the 
evaluation process carried out in the PMAQ and how they can access the performance data of the 
municipal teams.
Our study also suggests that the data collected in pay-for-performance programs can be a 
valuable resource for improving participation and social control, both in developed and high-income 
countries. In terms of the performance of health teams, our findings demonstrate that social control 
is one of the factors that influences the quality of services provided by health professionals. The pri-
mary care teams in this study had better results in municipalities where participatory health councils 
acted to regulate the use of resources. However the level of professional bonus also seems to be a 
key motivational factor as  in Mossoró, where the highest percentage of resources was earmarked 
for the payment of bonuses to health teams, there was a more significant improvement in perfor-
mance between the two evaluation cycles analyzed.
In addition, in Natal, where a lower percentage of funds is earmarked for bonus payments, 
the teams performed poorly. In such circumstances, the application of significant resources to bo-
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nuses may in fact, lead to a widening of inequality in performance between poorly performing and 
high performing teams. In the three large municipalities studied, the teams with the best perfor-
mance received a higher percentage of the PMAQ resources in the form of a bonus. Thus, it is impor-
tant to conduct studies to generate knowledge about teams with lower performance in contexts of 
greater vulnerability. The teams with the lowest performance may find themselves in a situation of 
demand for more resources to provide quality services. In other words, unsatisfactory performance 
may be related to the collective health problems prevalent in cities with greater socioeconomic and 
political-institutional vulnerability. The relationship between personal reward, supporting team re-
sources and infrastructure and social control deserves further examination. 
We did not identify any other studies that have examined the role of social control in 
PMAQ. Therefore, in this study we sought to advance the understanding of PMAQ attributes by ex-
ploring pursuing initiatives that focus on other topics of interest, such as the satisfaction of the users 
of health services, as found in Abreu et al. (2018), Protasio et al. (2017a) and Protasio et al. (2017b). 
Although the pay-for-performance program is having positive results in Brazil, there are conflicts 
about how the resources are being invested that need to be considered by health managers so that 
social inequalities are not deepened in Brazil. For example, if the managers decide to distribute the 
most part of the money to teams with better performance, it needs to be clear if the health teams 
worked in area with the same social and economic issues. Health teams working in deprived areas 
may have difficulty to achieve the results.
This study indicates that the municipality with more active social control tends to achieve 
superior performance of the health teams in the PMAQ, once the municipality that achieved the 
best performance in this studied is where most part of resources was distributed as bonus to the 
health teams. And this distribution of the resources was possible through a law that Mossoró’s Mu-
nicipal Health Council articulated to approve. 
What about based on our study it would seem beneficial to the Ministry of Health to indi-
cate in the legal document that regulates PMAQ the obligation to create commissions within munic-
ipalities, with the participation of municipal health councils, in order to monitor the implementation 
and evaluation of the PMAQ.  This could be a formal element of the process with clear regulatory 
guidelines about their status, their role and structure. It will also mean that some requirement is 
placed on municipalities to respond to the commissions and be held to account.
Such commissions may, for example, conduct local assessments to assist the municipality 
in meeting the goals established under the PMAQ. They may also be useful in clarifying internal 
disagreements in controversial points of view- as in the definition of the use of resources passed on 
by the Ministry of Health to the municipality. There is benefit from involving health councils in the 
PMAQ review process, then we suggest the Municipal Health Councils could be formal part of PMAQ 
evaluation. 
While our study was limited to an examination of three comparative municipalities it does 
indicate possible problems with the current process which both confirm findings in previous stud-
ies but also highlight potential changes to the process of PMAQ and resource allocation to primary 
health teams. However, it would be useful to have more in-depth research on the operation of the 
PMAQ and its impact, the variations in the process of resource allocation and the involvement of 
participatory health councils and local commissions where they exist. 
Research examine other regions of Brazil and municipalities of small and medium size, to 
increase our understanding of attributes related to the relation between participation and social 
control, and performance of the teams in the PMAQ. It is also suggested that such studies be carried 
out in municipalities with a population of less than 100,000 inhabitants in Rio Grande do Norte, to 
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observe the relationship between population size, social control, and evaluation performance. Such 
studies need to include data from the more recent third cycle of external evaluation when results are 
available from the Ministry of Health.
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